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When large in number, 
intermediaries—even 
those reputed for high 
 risk and correlated   
strategies—exhibit   
substantial diversity 
 that adds an important 
element of stability to
 the financial system.
D
iversity across banks and other financial firms promotes a 
resilient financial system because differing risk profiles reduce 
the likelihood of systemic crises caused by shared economic shocks. 
Consolidation and uniformity among banks and other financial intermedi-
aries do the opposite.  
Yet some have suggested that any policy steps to reverse the financial 
system’s dramatic consolidation might yield little stability benefit because 
herd-like behavior among financial firms could still reduce diversity and 
mitigate any strengthening. If these firms moved in concert, the argument 
goes, they would make themselves susceptible to common shocks as if 
they had adopted a more consolidated structure. 
Countering this concern are indications that financial firms, when 
allowed to flourish, display stability-enhancing diversity. We find that 
hedge funds—despite a reputation for high-risk strategies and correlated 
behavior—recently have exhibited significant strategic dissimilarities, to the 
benefit of system stability. 
Benefits of Diversity
A single bank can reduce its risks by diversifying loans and invest-
ments. However, if all diversify similarly, they generate an unintended 
consequence—a lack of diversity. As all banks seek the same fully diversi-
fied portfolio, they begin to look increasingly alike. And as their portfolios 
become more similar, their returns run together too. An adverse shock 
could then strike all banks simultaneously—all would be identically 
exposed—inflicting losses across the board. Ironically then, individual 
banks’ efforts to reduce risk can actually increase risk to the financial sys-
tem as a whole.1
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Similar reasoning applies to finan-
cial system consolidation. Bank merg-
ers do not appear capable of avoiding 
such systemic crisis. Consider a case 
where two banks fail, with each bank’s 
assets worth less than its liabilities. If 
the two had merged, assets would still 
be less than liabilities on a combined 
basis, producing no crisis mitigation.  
Moreover, not only does con-
solidation fail to avoid systemic crisis, 
it can actually lead to one. Suppose 
as separate entities two banks were 
diverse, with different risk profiles, so 
that when tough times came, the first 
failed by a large margin, while the sec-
ond escaped failure, albeit narrowly. If 
the two had merged, their combined 
assets would be less than combined lia-
bilities, resulting in total failure. Stability 
was enhanced, then, by leaving the 
two as separate, diverse institutions.2
Are Intermediaries Diverse?
Reflecting the concern that banks 
and other financial firms might assume 
similar strategies, part of industry regu-
lation seeks to contain the propensity 
for such correlated risks.3 This would 
appear to be a great challenge, par-
ticularly during boom periods, when 
adverse risk is often incurred, since 
threat perception tends to be low and 
opposition to regulatory constraints is 
high. 
But while concern over corre-
lated risks is real, it appears exagger-
ated. It is true that the largest banks 
have demonstrated a tendency to 
take similar risks, as with mortgage-
related loans and investments during 
the financial crisis, resulting in severe 
and pervasive losses. Yet it is also true 
that among small and mid-sized banks, 
exposures and losses have been much 
more varied, pointing to considerable 
diversity for these size classes.4
Hedge Fund Diversity
Hedge funds provide an example 
of intermediary diversity and crisis 
experience. A prominent historical 
example of correlated losses occurred 
when numerous hedge funds needed 
to close out similar portfolio positions 
simultaneously as Long-Term Capital 
Management (LTCM) collapsed in 1998 
under the weight of its highly lever-
aged, derivative-laden holdings. 
After that experience, financial 
authorities became especially wary of 
the potential for correlated risks in the 
hedge fund industry, making it a par-
ticularly interesting intermediary class 
for a diversity assessment. For data, we 
examined compound monthly returns 
by year for 1,190 dollar-based hedge 
funds that reported continuously in 
the Lipper TASS database from 2004 
through June 2011.5
Chart 1 displays the distribution of 
returns for our sample of hedge funds. 
The uppermost line represents the 
95th percentile, with only 5 percent 
of the funds earning a higher return. 
The lowest line is the fifth percentile, 
with 95 percent of the funds earning 
a higher return. The middle line (50th 
percentile) is the median return. The 
percentiles are calculated for each 
year separately, and the position of an 
individual hedge fund within the distri-
bution may change from year to year, 
depending on how it is performing 
relative to the others. 
The first pattern of note involves 
the distribution of returns during 
the boom of 2004–06. Little change 
occurred over this period, other than a 
slight upward trend. But more impor-
tantly, even under these highly favor-
able operating conditions, a substantial 
level of diversity in returns is apparent, 
with the return percentiles during the 
boom period covering a fairly broad 
range, from around zero to more than 2 
percent.6 
In 2007, the return distribution 
widened further as the crisis began. 
Severe losses ensued for many funds 
in 2008 in the midst of the crisis. 
But interestingly, in this down year, 
the 95th percentile held fairly firm, 
with some funds managing to earn 
high profits even in the toughest of 
environments.
Coming out of the crisis, 2009 was 
a banner year for many funds, presum-
ably reflecting strategic positioning 
ahead of a market bounceback. But 
then in 2010, returns declined to more 
normal levels and kept falling during 
the first half of 2011, with the current 
year turning out to be a rough one for 
Chart 1
Profits Differ Greatly Across Hedge Funds
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the industry. The return distribution 
has remained a little wider following 
the crisis than prior to it.
Overall, return disparities across 
hedge funds suggest considerable 
diversity in risk exposures and out-
comes. Of particular interest is how 
the risk differences observed across 
hedge funds played out during the 
boom years and subsequent crisis; that 
is, were the same funds always among 
the top performers, year after year, or 
did the relative rankings of individual 
funds change significantly?
To answer this question, Chart 2 
shows individual hedge fund returns 
over the entire sample period for two 
groups. Those in red were the top 10 
percent return performers in 2006, the 
peak of the boom years. Those in blue 
were the bottom 10 percent return per-
formers in 2006. By construction, then, 
a gap in returns exists between the two 
groups in the base year of 2006, repre-
senting the mid-level performance range 
of the remaining 80 percent of funds.   
Many of the top performers from 
2006 also tended to have high returns 
in the earlier boom years of 2004 and 
2005. But in 2007, the performance of 
these funds began deteriorating, and 
their returns plummeted in 2008. They 
rebounded in 2009 but have since 
drifted lower. Given the high return 
volatility displayed by this group, we 
characterize them as pursuing high-
variance, or aggressive, investment 
strategies. 
Meanwhile, returns for the worst 
performers in 2006 were relatively 
constant over the entire sample period. 
Remarkably, this was true even during 
the height of the crisis in 2008. These 
appear to be low-variance, or conser-
vatively managed, funds. Note that in 
2008, when the crisis hit in earnest, the 
conservatively managed funds actually 
generated superior performance, there-
by providing an important degree of 
stability to both the upper portion of 
the return distribution and the hedge 
fund industry in general. 
This conclusion receives addi-
tional support from Chart 3, showing 
the distribution of returns in 2008 for 
those hedge funds that were among 
the lowest 20 percent of all perform-
ers in 2006, a somewhat broader slice 
than just the bottom 10 percent funds 
examined previously. Although these 
funds had been the worst performers, 
Chart 2
Boom-Period Underperforming Hedge Funds Aid Stability 
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about 40 percent of them ascended 
to the top fifth of the return distribu-
tion for 2008. Only about 10 percent 
of these previously underperforming 
funds remained in the lowest quintile 
during the crisis. Therefore, it seems 
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role, providing stable and superior 
returns when the operating environ-
ment turned sour.  
Diversity Emerges
Theory suggests diversity across 
numerous financial intermediaries in 
terms of risk postures and exposures 
can enhance financial system stability. 
However, some have suggested inter-
mediaries, even if numerous, tend to 
act as a herd, adopting highly similar 
strategies and yielding little stability 
benefit. While this is a valid concern, 
available data suggest the situation is 
often otherwise: When large in num-
ber, intermediaries—even those reput-
ed for high risk and correlated strate-
gies—exhibit substantial diversity that 
adds an important element of stability 
to the financial system.
Chen is a financial industry analyst and Gunther 
a vice president in the Financial Industry Studies 
Department at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Notes
1 For formal arguments in this area, see “Pooling 
Intensifies Joint Failure Risk,” by Sherrill Shaffer, 
Research in Financial Services, vol. 6, 1994, pp. 
249–80; “Diversification at Financial Institutions 
and Systemic Crises,” by Wolf Wagner, Journal of 
Financial Intermediation, vol. 19, no. 3, 2010, pp. 
373–86; and “Diversification Disasters,” by Rustam 
Ibragimov, Dwight Jaffee and Johan Walden, 
Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 99, no. 2, 2011, 
pp. 333–48. 
2 This discussion focuses on the combination 
versus separation of a given set of assets across 
banks and, thus, abstracts from various potential in-
fluences of bank size and market structure on other 
aspects of risk and risk taking. For example, if large 
banks are comparatively prone to risk taking, bank 
mergers could reduce financial system stability not 
only through the combination effect discussed here, 
but also by creating more risk-inclined banks. 
3 See “A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of 
Prudential Bank Regulation,” by Viral V. Acharya, 
Journal of Financial Stability, vol. 5, no. 3, 2009, pp. 
224–55.
4 Some point to the Great Depression as a case of 
widespread failure among smaller banks. However, 
that episode occurred under different institutional 
arrangements than exist today and arguably may 
have represented more of a system liquidity issue 
than a case of pervasive high risk taking among so 
many individual banks.
5 Because we wish to track the return experience 
of individual hedge funds over time, we restrict our 
sample to a panel of actively reporting funds that 
operated over our entire sample period. As such, 
our results may not necessarily reflect the experi-
ence of the entire hedge fund industry, because 
many funds possess relatively short lives and their 
risk propensities and outcomes may differ from 
those of longer-lived funds. 
6  The full set of dollar-based hedge funds reporting 
to Lipper TASS in 2006, as opposed to the restricted 
number contained in our panel of funds, shows a 
similar level of return dispersion, with –0.25, 0.2, 
0.59, 0.89, 1.27, 1.84 and 2.50 percent for the fifth, 
10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th and 95th percentiles, 
respectively. 